Abstract. Reputation systems for Peer-to-Peer (P2P) networks are relatively new. Most of the existing systems are centrally controlled hence raising scalability issues and single points of failure. In this paper we present a completely decentralized reputation scheme for P2P networks. The system is based on a certificate, RCert, which is a document that resides on a participating P2P node, which consists of information ratings collected from previous transactions with other peers. Central to the scheme is the concept of Public Key Infrastructure (PKI), upon on which much of the mechanism is based. In order to facilitate updates of RCert certificates, we present two protocols, RCertP and RCertP X. RCertP does not prevent the node from using older copies of RCert. An extended version, RCertP X, solves this problem by keeping track of the latest timestamp.
Introduction
Peer-to-Peer (P2P) systems are currently receiving considerable interest in the world of Internet technologies. In a P2P system, there is usually no centralized control or hierarchical organization, and all the independent entities, called peers, pool their resources together to share information and services. However, the participants in the P2P system do not have the same competence and reliability.
Firstly, some of the participants may not perform the services they provide at a satisfactory level. For example, a peer with a slow CPU (processing power) always results in long response time. Secondly, some dishonest participants may cheat in the multi-lateral transactions, such as receiving goods from others without giving anything in return. In some cases, the malicious participants may distribute Trojan Horse and Virus programs when providing various services. Therefore, it is necessary for a P2P system to inform the participants the trustworthiness of the other participant nodes in the network, so that they can choose a reliable and capable participant to interact with.
A reputation system is an effective way to facilitate the trust in a P2P system. It collects and aggregates the feedback of participants' past behaviors, which is known as reputation, and publishes the reputations so that everyone can view it freely. The reputation informs the participant about other's ability and disposition, and helps the participant to decide who to trust. Furthermore, reputation system also encourages participant to be more trustworthy and discourages those who are not from participating.
Centralized approach to P2P reputation system has many problems. The first problem is concerned with the storage of the reputation information. The reputation has to be stored in a distributed manner, but with high availability, especially in P2P systems where peers can appear offline from time to time. Additionally, the reputation should be retrieved efficiently since it is used frequently. The second problem is the integrity of the reputation, since the reputation is useful only when it is tamper-resistant. In a centralized reputation system, the integrity of the reputation can be protected by the server's access control mechanism. In the P2P reputation systems, there is no single entity that is responsible for protecting the reputation, and the access control mechanism is hard to establish. Thus, we have to resort to other techniques, such as cryptography.
In this paper, we propose a simple and efficient P2P reputation scheme that aims at solving the two problems. In our scheme, the reputation is maintained by the owner. This greatly simplifies the problem of storing reputation information. In addition, the retrieval of the reputation information can be done efficiently without adding any addition communication cost. Since the reputation information is being stored by the owner, the information must be free from tampering by the owner. To protect the integrity of the reputation, we have introduced the notion of reputation certificate we termed RCert. At the same time we propose protocols to facilitate the update of the reputation information.
Related Work
Kevin A. Burton designed the OpenPrivacy Distributed Reputation System [1] on P2P It proposed the concept of reputation network, which is composed by identities (representing nodes) and evaluation certificates (representing edges). Therefore, the trustworthiness of the identities can be estimated from a visible sub-graph of the reputation network. It involves a lot of message exchange in order to obtain a good understanding a party's reputation.
P2PREP [2] , a reputation sharing protocol proposed for Gnutella, where each peer keeps track and shares with others the reputation of their peers. Reputation sharing is based on a distributed polling protocol. The scheme suffers the same problem of efficient retrieval of reputation information.
Karl Aberer and Zoran Despotovic [3] proposed a trust managing system on the P2P system P-Grid [4] . It integrates the trust management and data management schemes to build a full-fledged P2P architecture for information systems. The reputations in this system are expressed as complaints; the more complaints a peer gets, the less trustworthy it could be. The trust managing system is tightly coupled to the architecture of P-Grid, and is not flexible to be extended to other P2P systems.
Dietrich Fahrenholtz and Winfried Lamersdof [5] introduced a distributed reputation management system. The reputation information is kept by its owner, and public key cryptography is used to solve the integrity and non-repudiation issues. During each transaction, a portal acts as a trusted third party to resolve the possible disputation during the reputation update. But in a P2P system without any centralized control, to establish the role of a trusted third party is highly undesirable.
System Design

Components
Public Key Infrastructure (PKI). PKI [6] is employed to provide security properties which includes confidentiality, integrity, authentication and nonrepudiation. All these are achieved through the use of symmetric and asymmetric cryptography as well as digital signatures. We have omitted the confidentiality requirement in our proposed scheme as our goal is not to provide communication secrecy among peers.
Entities. There are two entities in the system. A peer that provides services (service provider) and a peer that consumes services (service consumer). In P2P system, a peer can act as a service provider as well as service consumer. This is because in P2P there is no true distinction between server and client. Entities in the network has a pair of public and private keys that represent its identity. At the same time, the pair of keys is used in the digital signature process. We assume there exists a mechanism that allow a peer to be located and contacted given its identity. This can be achieved through the use of P2P system such as [7] , which provide efficient lookup mechanisms.
Roles. There are two different roles a peer plays. After a peer has finished consuming a service provided by a peer, it take up the role of a rater. The peer that provides the services will be termed ratee. The rater is responsible for evaluating the ratee based on the experience of the interaction with ratee. We shall defer the protocol used in the rating process to section 4.
Reputation Certificates (RCert). RCert consists of two components:
header and RCertU nit. The information is updated by the service consumer each time after a transaction has taken place. Every update is appended to the end of RCert and is digitally signed by the ratee to prevent the owner from changing the information. Figure 1 depicts the format of RCert.
RCert header gives information about its owner, such as owner's identity and owner's public key. This information binds the RCert to its owner. Besides, the header also includes information about RCert such as RCert's current ID and previous ID if this certificate is not the first created by the owner. With the ID information, this allows the owner to create a new RCert but still provides a pointer to previous RCert own by the owner. When an RCert grows too big, the owner can create a new RCert and provides the reference to the old RCert -T imeStamp -issued by the owner right before a transaction is started. It is digitally signed by the issuer and is used as a proof of transaction. -Rating -this is the comment given by a peer that had the transaction with the owner. It records the transaction experience of the rater with the owner. -RaterID -this is the identity of the peer that created this rating (RCertU nit). -Signature -the signature is created by the rater, using its private key, on the entire RCert including the header for the integrity of the RCert. Figure 2 shows the mechanism of the protocol. It involves 6 steps. Assuming a peer needs certain service from other peers. It first uses resource discovery mechanism such as those mentioned in [8, 9] to locate service provider (step 1). All the peers that have the resources needed by the requesting peer send reply together with their Reputation certificate (RCert) (step 2). After evaluating all the RCert, the requesting peer makes decision on which peer to choose as service provider and sends an acknowledgement to the provider (step 3). The acknowledgment is digitally signed with the requester's private key and it shall be used as a proof of transaction request. This is followed by the sending of TimeStamp from the provider to the requester (step 4). The TimeStamp is signed by the provider and in this protocol it contains the time value on the provider machine. The requester will then verify the time and signature on the timestamp by using the public key of provider. We However, there should be a way for the requester to check the correctness of the time (e.g., the time should not be too different from the time in requester system). Peers then start the transaction (step 5). Upon completion of the transaction, the service requester starts to rate its service provider. The rater (service requester) updates the RCert sent to it in step 2 by adding the timestamp from step 4, followed by the rating based on the transaction experience. The rater also added its ID. The rater completes the updates by hashing the content of the certificate and digitally signs the hash with its private key. The new updated certificate is sent to the provider (step 6) to be presented to the next service requester.
Protocol
Basic Protocol -RCertP
The reputation certificate provides the property of tampered evidence. Every time an authorize rater updates the reputation certificate, it digitally sign the certificate with its digital signature. A service requester can always check the integrity of the certificate by retrieving the last rater's public key and verify the signature on the certificate.
Although this method of updating prevent the owner from changing the content of the certificate, it does not prevent the owner from totally discard the newly updated certificate. However, we feel that for usage in system where the correctness is not so critical it could be sufficient. The reason is a service requester can add some heuristics when verifying the content of the certificate. For instance, the timestamp in the certificate can be used as a heuristics. Since timestamp of transaction is added to the certificate, a verifier can always check on the statistic of the transaction frequency. If the rating in the certificate has been good and there exists some abnormal change in the transaction frequency, one needs to be skeptical about the certificate. Despite its drawback, the RCertP is simple and works in a decentralized setting. It provides a mean for a peer to collect and present its reputation to others in a simple and efficient way.
Extended Protocol -RCertP X
We extended the RCertP to give extra level of assurance to the correctness of the RCert and still maintain the decentralized nature of the protocol. The RCertP X is shown in figure 3 . In this protocol, we introduce another data structure: Last-TimeStamp. A Last-TimeStamp consists of three elements: Re vo ke
Fig. 3. RCertP Protocol -T imeStamp issued by service provider -Status of the T imeStamp (valid/revoked) -RevokedP eer -identity of the party authorized the revoked
The Last-TimeStamp provides the validity of the RCert currently used by an RCert owner. The extension of the protocol involved previous service consumers. These consumers act as Last-TimeStamp holder.
Step 1 and 2 of the RCertP X is similar to those of the RCertP . Upon receiving the RCert, the requester needs to verify the validity of the RCert (step 3). This is done by checking the last RCert Unit in the RCert by contacting the rater. If the rater returns a Last-TimeStamp that has not been revoked, the RCert is valid (step 4). In event where the last rater is not available (eg. offline), the requester can try to contact the preceding raters until there is one that is available. In this case, the verification is done by checking on the Last-TimeStamp in the following way. The T imeStamp information in the LastTimeStamp should match those on the RCertU nit created by the rater and since the Last-TimeStamp has been revoked, the RevokedP eer in the Last-TimeStamp must match the next rater specify in the RCert.
The extra verification mechanism provides more information about the transaction history of the RCert's owner and refrains a peer from using any of its old RCert.
Step 5 and 6 are similar to step 3 and 4 in the RCertP . However, the T imeStamp used in RCertP X has an extra information: the transaction counter. Therefore, instead of storing only time information, the new protocol requires the ratee to incorporate the extra information in the timestamp when sends to the rater. When the rater received the timestamp it should check the correctness of the time and counter included in the timestamp. Similar to RCertP , the time stamp should be digitally signed by the ratee. The counter incorporated reflects the latest information about the transaction sequence. For instance, if there have been 20 transaction so far, the counter information in the T imeStamp should reflect 21 as its value.
Updating of the RCert is performed similarly as in those shown in RCertP . However, we require the rater to do two extra steps.
1. The rater needs to create and store the Last − T imeStamp and make it available to others when needed. 2. If the rater is not the first one to rate the service provider, it needs to contact the previous rater to 'revoke' the piece of Last − T imeStamp store.
After rater has done the two steps, it sends the updated certificate to the ratee. The two amendments we introduced to RCertP X is able to prevent the rater from cheating by discarding those certificate that has bad comment about transaction with it. This is accomplished through the counter information store in the timestamp. When checking the correctness of the timestamp, a rater contacts the preceding rater and gets the timestamp information stored in it.
The current rater verifies the correctness of the timestamp against those reflected on the RCert. If the two matches, the rater confirms that the timestamp information send by the ratee is correct. The rater then issues a request to the preceding rater to revoke the timestamp stored there by sending the latest timestamp sent to it by the ratee. To verify the request, a rater checks the timestamp.
-The time in timestamp must be more current than the one currently stored.
-The counter in the timestamp must be the next number to the one currently stored. -The timestamp must indeed sign by the ratee.
Once the preceding rater is convinced that the timestamp sends to it is correct, it revokes the timestamp information stored locally by creating a status 'revoke' and place a digital signature on the revoked timestamp. Upon receiving the acknowledgement that the preceding rater has revoked the timestamp on its side, the current rater sends the updated reputation certificate to the ratee. The ratee should use the updated certificate for its next transaction.
Analysis and Discussion
RCertP
RCertP provides the assurance that if an RCert is presented and the signature is verified to valid, the content in the RCert has not been changed by the owner. This is achieved through the use of digital signature on the entire RCert.
In the case where ratee (RCert owner) becomes malicious, the ratee is able to ignore the updates of the RCert sent by rater and continue to use the old RCert. Another possibility is that ratee can always send a blank RCert when approached. The RCertP does not prevent these situations from happening due to lack of information about ratee's transaction history.
Although it might seem unacceptable, we face this problem in our day to day life. An analogous scenario would be dealing with a complete stranger. The stranger can refer us to those that will give a good recommendation. On the other hand, the stranger can just tell us that he/she does not have someone who can be a referee. A normal reaction will be to give very low trust to the stranger.
Similarly in our case, if a requester gets an RCert from a provider that is blank, the requester can just assign a very low trust value to the provider and it can choose another provider if that provider is giving a better RCert. For the case where a provider has reused old RCert, it can do it only for the latest rating. It will be pointless if the provider is getting bad comments all the time, since it will not be able to provide much rating information in its RCert. Furthermore, the fact that a provider cannot change the content of the RCert prevents it from selectively deleting those giving bad comments. A requester can make use of some heuristics when judging the correctness of the RCert, such as the frequency of the transaction. It can favor providers with more transaction rating over those with a lesser number of rating.
In the case where rater turns malicious, there is no great impact because the most it can do to the ratee is not to give any rating or give a very bad rating. In both cases, it will not affect the ratee much, because if ratee is genuinely good, chances of it getting good rating from others is very high.
In this protocol, there is no threat in the case where rater and ratee colludes. There is no reason why the two should collude and even if they do it will not be able to affect the correctness of the RCert further.
RCertP X
Much of the discussion mentioned in the section 5.1 holds for RCertP X as well. RCertP X also provides the integrity of the RCert presented. In addition, Last-TimeStamp used in the protocol provides information about the validity of RCert. With the Last-TimeStamp, a requester can verify the validity of the RCert by contacting previous rater. If the Last-TimeStamp has not been revoked, it indicates that the RCert is up to date; otherwise, the RCert is an old one, and might not be valid. This prevents the provider from discarding the unsatisfied rating by reusing its old RCert.
Three parties are evolved in this protocol. They are the ratee, the current rater and one of the the previous raters. In the following discussion, we show that if anyone of them is malicious, the correctness of the RCert will not get tampered.
In the case where ratee turns malicious, it will be able to send a blank RCert to the user. However, it will not be able to reuse its old RCert like what happen in RCertP protocol. This is because the Last-TimeStamp introduced provides the mechanism to prevent this from happening. When a ratee is using back the old RCert, during verification of the RCert, its act will be exposed. Our reasoning for the case where RCert owner uses a blank RCert is the same as those mentioned in RCertP discussion. A blank RCert should be regarded as having very low correctness.
On the other hand, if the current rater acts maliciously, it can either refuse to give an rating or give an invalid signature on the RCert.
However, this will not cause any problem at all. When the rater refuse to give any rating, the ratee can present the acknowledgement sent by the rater during transaction confirmed (step 5 of RCertP X) that the rater has indeed requested for the transaction. In the event where rater purposefully gives an invalid signature on the RCert, the ratee can present the acknowledgement to the previous rater to request arbitration. Then the previous rater can require the current rater to present his update again. If the current rater refuse to give the update, or present an invalid one, the previous rater can cancel the revocation on its Last-TimeStamp. If the current rater present a valid update, the previous rater will send it to the ratee.
When the previous rater acts maliciously, it can:
1. refuse to present the Last-TimeStamp 2. give a revoked Last-TimeStamp even if it has not been revoked
For case 1, if the current rater cannot get the Last-TimeStamp, it cannot verify the validity of RCert. The same thing happens when the previous rater is off-line for the moment. This is very common in the P2P networks. Our amendment to this problem is to use a group of previous raters rather a single previous rater. Each previous rater keeps a count number on the Last-TimeStamp, whose initial value is the total number of previous raters. In each revocation of LastTimeStamp, the count number is reduced by 1. When the count number reaches 0, the Last-TimeStamp is revoked completely, and the rater leaves the previous rater group automatically. Therefore, if the number of previous raters is N , the last N raters are all capable of verifying the validity of RCert. When the last previous rater refuses to present the Last-TimeStamp, the current rater can refer to the second last previous rater. If there are enough previous raters, there is always a previous rater that can do the verification.
For case 2, to prevent the previous rater to give an forged revoked LastTimeStamp, we require it to present a certificate by the revoker as well. If it cannot show any evidence of the revocation, the current rater can regard the Last-TimeStamp as a fresh one.
Although the RCertP X can prevent tampering of the RCert, it cannot prevent malicious participants collude to distort the reputation information. For example, if the ratee and current rater collude, they might succeed to discard the latest ratings of the RCert. However, with the mechanism we mentioned above, it is harder for the rater to achieve this as it will need to collude with N previous ratees at the same time.
Conclusion
In this paper we presented the concept of a completely decentralized reputation scheme for Peer-to-Peer (P2P) network. The system is based on a certificate, RCert, which is a tamper resistant document that resides on a P2P node. RCert consists of information ratings collected from previous transactions with other peers. This has greatly simplify the reputation request process as compared to most of the existing method. In order to facilitate updates of RCert certificates, we presented a protocol, RCertP . Although easy to implement, RCertP does not prevent the node from using older copies of RCert. Hence we also presented an extended version, RCertP X, which solves this problem by keeping track of the latest timestamp.
For the future work, we will focus on improvement on the assurance of the correctness of the RCert especially for the case where rater and ratee collude to turn malicious. One of the possible solutions will be introducing other entity like 'auditor' to certify the correctness of the RCert. At the same time, we will look into the rating method. In this paper, for simplicity, we have limited the rating to pure comment. We hope to incorporate more advance rating methods, which will require us to look into various rating mechanisms.
